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An  Equilibrium  Model  of  the  Crash 
1. Summary 
Presented in this paper is a view  of the market break on October 19, 1987 
that fits much of what we  know.  I assume  that investors' tastes changed 
before the crash, and that their beliefs changed both before and during the 
crash. Before the crash, investors' tastes became more and more flexible. 
(Their tastes are "flexible" if they become  more risk tolerant with  rising 
wealth.) Also before the crash, investors' estimates of mean reversion grew 
much  more  slowly  than actual mean  reversion,  so  that the bias in their 
estimates increased. ("Mean reversion" is a change in expected return that 
moves in the opposite direction from a change in the market level after that 
change occurs.) In this view, the major trigger for the crash was the sudden 
awareness  that actual mean reversion was higher than investors thought. 
This realization caused them to reduce their expected return estimates for 
markets around  the  world.  Prices fell until expected  returns were  high 
enough that investors were willing to hold the existing supplies of common 
stocks. The turmoil that followed led investors to cut back their willingness 
to hold stocks at given expected returns, which pulled down  the market's 
equilibrium level even more. 
2. What  Happened1 
On October 19, 1987, the U.S. stock market showed  its largest percentage 
decline on record for a single day. Other world stock markets showed  large 
declines,  too.  Volatility rose sharply and market maker spreads widened 
dramatically. 
No  sensational headline triggered the break. Some have pointed  to the 
progress  of  legislation  in  creating tax barriers to  takeovers,  and  indeed 
takeover candidates did decline more than other stocks on October 19. But 
1. These events  are reported in Brady, et al. (1988). 270  BLACK 
this may have been due to the crash itself. Any large decline will increase 
the  chance  that  an  announced  or  prospective  takeover  deal  will  fall 
through.2 
There were  a few  very large sellers on October 19. It seems  that all of 
them were using dynamic strategies that call for increasing stock holdings 
after the market goes  up,  and decreasing stock holdings  after the market 
goes  down.  Mutual  funds  were  using  these  strategies  because  their 
shareholders were using  them.  Some of these  strategies are called "port- 
folio insurance." A number of large investors adopted portfolio insurance 
in the months  and years before October 19. Many of them  used  futures 
contracts to change  their market exposure.  During the week  of the 19th, 
futures prices went  far below  their theoretical values just when  portfolio 
insurers wanted to sell. As a result, many managers dropped their portfolio 
insurance strategies on October 19th, or in the weeks  that followed.3 
3.  Dynamic Strategies 
A dynamic  strategy is any strategy that changes  exposure  to the market 
after changes  in the market level.  We can use  the term "portfolio insur- 
ance"  to  describe  a  strategy  where  buying  and  selling  are consistently 
related to market moves.  An investor who consistently buys after a market 
rise and sells after a market fall is "buying" portfolio insurance. The reverse 
activity is  "selling" portfolio insurance.4 Portfolio insurance  sellers must 
exist to balance portfolio insurance buyers. The sellers may call themselves 
"value  investors,"  or users  of  "dividend  discount  models,"  or "tactical 
asset allocators." But whatever name is used,  someone  must sell portfolio 
insurance if anyone  is to buy it. 
When  we  analyze  the behavior of the  market, we  often  speak  of the 
"typical investor."  We  say,  for example,  that the  market acts as  if the 
typical investor were risk averse. A model with only one class of investor 
may be easier to understand than a model with two or more classes.  But, 
the  typical  investor  cannot  use  a  dynamic  strategy.  In equilibrium,  he 
maintains his position; he neither buys nor sells. 
2. Shiller (1987) reports that most investors  reacted more to the crash itself than to outside 
news. 
3. "66% Drop in Portfolio Insurance." Pensions  and Investment  Age, January 25, 1988, p. 2. 
4. Brennan  and  Schwartz  (1988), Brignoli (1988), Kling  (1988), Leland  (1987), Rubinstein 
(1988), and  Shiller (1988) discuss  the  relationship  between  portfolio insurance  and  the 
crash. Their analyses are similar to mine, except that they generally assume that one group 
of investors is optimizing, while another group is using dynamic strategies. In my analysis, 
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4. Flexible  Tastes 
In a model with several classes of investors, differences in taste for risk will 
not cause any of them to use dynamic strategies. We need investors whose 
tastes for risk increase with wealth at different rates.5 We will say that an 
investor  whose  taste  for  risk  increases  rapidly  with  wealth  has  more 
"flexible" tastes than one whose  taste increases less rapidly. Investors with 
more  flexible  tastes  will  buy  portfolio insurance,  while  those  with  less 
flexible tastes will sell portfolio insurance, all else equal. 
Even  though  the  typical  investor  is  neither  a  buyer  nor  a  seller  of 
portfolio insurance, he can have more or less flexible tastes. A change in the 
typical investor's tastes will affect the market equilibrium. 
5. Mean  Reversion 
The market's "mean  reversion" is the  change  in  the  market's expected 
return  following  a  change  in  the  market level.  It is  measured  by  the 
negative of the percentage point change in expected return per percentage 
point return in the market. The change in the market level may cause the 
change in expected return, or the change in expected return may cause the 
change in the market level. Causation flows in both directions. The change 
in  expected  return associated  with  a change  in the  market need  not  be 
permanent.  In fact, it is likely to disappear over time if there is no other 
change in the market. 
I believe  that  there  is  normally  considerable  mean  reversion  in  the 
market-but  it's very hard to estimate how much.6 And it is doubly hard to 
detect a change  in the market's mean reversion by looking  only at stock 
returns. A long  series of stock returns tells us  mostly  about the average 
expected return and the average mean reversion over the period. 
6. Equilibrium 
In this model,  the factor that moves to bring the market into equilibrium is 
mean reversion. The inputs to the model are investors' tastes for risk and 
5. Leland (1980) shows  that investors with rapidly increasing taste for risk will be more likely 
to use portfolio insurance than other investors. 
6. Fama and French (1986) and Poterba and Summers (1987) try to estimate the average mean 
reversion in the market. French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) estimate mean reversion 
indirectly: they relate expected return to volatility, and volatility is negatively related to past 
return. Merton (1980) shows  how  difficult it is to find the exact relation between  expected 
return and volatility. A similar argument would  show  how  difficult it is to find the exact 
relation between  expected return and market level. Black (1986) discusses  observable and 
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their beliefs  about mean  reversion.  All else  equal,  when  investors  have 
more flexible tastes, actual mean reversion will be greater. Likewise, when 
the  downward  bias in investors'  beliefs about mean  reversion is bigger, 
actual mean reversion will be greater. 
In fact, we may have a lot of trouble distinguishing  the effects of tastes 
and beliefs about the equilibrium. More flexible tastes and a larger bias in 
beliefs  about mean  reversion will have  similar or identical effects on  the 
equilibrium. 
In this model,  a small shift in tastes can have a large impact on actual 
mean reversion and volatility. Suppose  that investors' beliefs about mean 
reversion remain constant, while their tastes for risk become more flexible. 
There  will  be  no  equilibrium.  Actual  mean  reversion  cannot  be  high 
enough  to create equlibrium. What brings the market to equilibrium is the 
fact that beliefs about mean reversion must eventually  change.  As actual 
mean reversion rises, it will become clear that the bias in investors' beliefs 
about mean reversion is large. Thus a shift to more flexible tastes must give 
an  increase  in  expected  mean  reversion,  though  there  may  still be  a 
difference between  actual and expected mean reversion. 
7. The  Crash 
Stock  prices  declined  sharply  on  a  day  when  there  were  no  major 
headlines.  In the  absence  of big  news  in  the  ordinary sense,  the  price 
decline  may  have  reflected  changing  interpretations  of  past  news  or 
changing  tastes for risk. If investors  had become  more risk averse,  their 
reaction would have made prices drop. The big sellers were using dynamic 
strategies, which suggests that the decline was at least accelerated by them. 
The  increasing  use  of  dynamic  strategies  was  a  signal  that  the  typical 
investor's tastes or beliefs had been changing. To me, the most important 
fact in sorting through the story behind  October 19 is the termination of 
portfolio insurance strategies after the crash. That suggests  that the crash 
was  not triggered solely by news  plus  the normal operation of dynamic 
strategies.  Instead  investors'  beliefs,  especially  those  of  large  investors 
using dynamic strategies, changed.  Here is a story that I find plausible: 
In the months leading up to October 19, investors' tastes were changing. 
They  were  becoming  more  flexible.  This led  to  a moderate  increase  in 
volatility while  the  market was  rising,  whereas  normally  volatility  falls 
when  the  market rises.7 As  investors'  tastes  became  more  flexible,  the 
market's  mean  reversion  increased.  But the  typical investor's  expected 
mean reversion increased less.  As the market rose during 1986 and 1987, 
7. Black (1976) looks at the relation between  market return and volatility change. 1987  Stock  Market  Crash  - 273 
the true expected return on the market was falling, but investors thought it 
was  falling less.  This means  the market rose more than it would  have  if 
they had seen  the expected return clearly. 
By the morning of October 19, investors had become aware of how  the 
typical  investor's  tastes  had  changed.  Some  people  had  added  up  the 
assets  used  in portfolio insurance strategies and realized that lots of sell 
orders were  due  that day.  The market's behavior  during  the  day  gave 
further clues to the typical investor's tastes. As investors became aware that 
the  typical  investor  had  more  flexible  tastes  than  they  thought,  they 
increased their estimates of the market's mean reversion and reduced their 
estimates of the market's expected return. This made them less willing to 
hold stocks. The market fell sharply. 
As estimates of expected return fell for the U.S. market, they fell for other 
world markets. Equilibrium  could be restored only after world markets fell. 
The  decline  increased  estimates  of  expected  return again,  to  the  point 
where investors were willing to hold existing quantities of common  stock. 
What makes this story consistent with equilibrium, in my view,  is that 
expected return and mean reversion are both unobservable. It is very hard 
to estimate either one of them. So investors can have incorrect beliefs about 
these factors without violating normal equilibrium conditions. The story is 
not  consistent  with  rational expectations,  but  standard  statistical tests 
won't show this, because investors can do those same tests. The clues that 
lead us to believe that investors' tastes had become more flexible could not 
have been  derived from observing the path of the stock market alone. 
Note  that the equilibrium I describe is fragile.8 A small change in tastes 
or beliefs  gives  a large change  in mean  reversion  and  volatility. This is 
consistent  with  the  fact that  only  a  small  proportion  of  investors  had 
adopted  formal portfolio insurance strategies, and their trading played  a 
minor role in the market activity of October 19. 
8. Noise  Trading 
This can be viewed  as a noise  trading story.9 Noise  traders, as I define 
them, trade on noise as if it were news.  An example would be buying stock 
on news  that has already been discounted in the price. There is no general 
way  of finding  out whether  a given  piece of news  has been  discounted. 
That fact is unobservable,  in the same sense that expected return or mean 
reversion are unobservable. 
8. Kling (1988) has another model with fragile equilibria. Both models may have played a role 
in the crash. Leland (1987) describes a fragile equilibrium model related to mine. 
9. It seems  consistent  with the story told by De Long, et al. (1987). 274  BLACK 
In this model,  the noise is the bias in estimated mean reversion. Though 
we have direct evidence of a change in tastes, the market's volatility could 
just as well have been caused by a change in the bias. Probably, it was a mix 
of a change in tastes and a change in the bias. 
9. The  Psychological  Factor 
There is one more element that may play a part in an equilibrium model of 
the crash: psychology. 
The  level  of  the  market is  affected by  the  public's  confidence  in  the 
market and the breadth of its participation. The market will be higher when 
participation is broad instead of narrow. When more people are willing to 
share in the risk of the market, each one bears less risk. This means that the 
expected  return on the market can be lower and the market level higher. 
We  might  call this  element  "liquidity." Liquidity often  refers  to  the 
breadth of interest in a specific stock. When a stock has a liquid market, you 
can buy or sell a relatively large amount in a relatively short time without 
affecting the price too much. Here we are applying a similar concept to the 
market as a whole.  When there is broad public participation in the stock 
market, the level of the market will be high,  and a change in one group's 
desired holdings  won't cause a big change in price; other groups will take 
up  the  slack.  Such  a market will be  less  volatile than  one  with  narrow 
participation, all else equal. 
The problem is that breadth of participation is affected by things that are 
hard to capture in a model.  This is what  I mean  by  "the psychological 
factor." People may avoid trading because they have little confidence in the 
market. They may feel that the market is "too volatile;" that it may close 
unexpectedly  just when  they want to trade; that it may be so congested  at 
high volume times that trading will be hard; or that traders with computers 
have an unfair advantage. 
Feelings that have no apparent factual basis can affect liquidity too. An 
increase in volatility can scare people off, even when  it is due to a change 
in tastes or technology.  Since the causes  of volatility are not observable, 
even  economists  may decide that an increase is capricious, and they may 
urge investors  to be cautious. 
Whatever the original reasons  for the crash, it frightened  people.  The 
sharp decline, the high volatility, the mispriced securities, and the conges- 
tion caused people to withdraw from the market. This led to a decline in the 
equilibrium level of the market that was greater than the decline a model 
would  have figured-unless  it accounted for the psychological factor. 1987 Stock  Market  Crash ?  275 
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